

## Summit Aftermath: The View From the Oval Office

Text of Reagan's Broadcast Address  
On Talks With Gorbachev in Iceland

Special to the New York Times  
WASHINGTON, Oct. 13. Following is the text of President Reagan's broadcast address tonight on his meeting with the Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, in Iceland.

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

The implications of these talks are enormous and only just beginning to be understood.

We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered a complete elimination of all ballistic missiles — Soviet and American — from the face of the earth by 1998. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.

But first, let me tell you that from the start, my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy — world peace and freedom — be achieved. And it is for these aims I want the extra mile to Iceland.

Before I report on our talks tonight, allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks. One was the other's defense against nuclear missiles. The other was the defense against nuclear missiles. You've heard their titles a thousand times — the ABM treaty and the ABM treaty. These letters stand for anti-ballistic missile and Strategic Defense Initiative.

Some years ago, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missiles to the employment in one location in each country of a small number of missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming nuclear missiles. This leaving our first defense a policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack, the other side could retaliate. This mutual threat of destruction was believed to be a deterrent against any side striking first.

So here we sit with thousands of nuclear warheads targeted at each other and capable of wiping out both our countries. The Soviets deployed the few anti-ballistic missiles that Moscow as the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying because the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction made such limited defense seem useless.

## Goal of Missile Shield

For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets have been developing a nationwide defense. They have installed a large modern radar at Krashnoyarsk which believes is a critical part of a radar system designed to provide radar guidance for anti-ballistic missiles protecting the entire nation. This is a violation of the ABM treaty. Believing that a policy of mutual destruction and slaughter of our citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked our military a few years ago to study and see if there was a way to destroy nuclear missiles after their launch but before they can reach their targets rather than destroy people. This is the goal for what we call S.D.I., and our scientists researching such a system are convinced it is practical. In a few years down the road we can have such a system ready to deploy. Incidentally we are not violating the ABM

treaty, which permits such research. If and when we deploy, the treaty also allows withdrawal from the treaty upon six months' notice. S.D.I. let me make it clear — not pursuing a non-nuclear defense.

So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting. In the first and in the months in between, we have discussed ways to reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We and the Soviets have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to work out a mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. So far, no success.

On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz and I met for nearly 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let citizens emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and wives separated by national borders being allowed to reunite. In much of this the Soviet Union is violating an agreement — the Helsinki accords they had signed in 1975. Yuri Orlov, whose freedom we just obtained, was imprisoned for pointing out to his government its violations of the pact, its refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.

## Arms the Main Subject

We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. But by their choice the main subject was arms control. We discussed the employment of intermediate range missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be drastically reduced. Both sides

seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic ballistic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of S.D.I.

I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles, and then we would share the benefits of advanced defense.

I explained that even though we would have done away with our offensive ballistic missiles, having the defense would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make them. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I.

We seemed to be making progress in reducing weapons, although the General Secretary was registering opposition to S.D.I. and proposing a pledge to observe ABM for a number of years as the day was ending.

Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our note-takers had been making of everything we said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together. We agreed to do this in agreement and what differences separated us. With respect and gratitude, I can inform you they worked through the night till 6:30 A.M.

Yesterday, Sunday morning, Mr. Gorbachev and I, with our foreign ministers, came together again and took up the report of our teams. It was most promising. The Soviets had asked for a 10-year delay in the deployment of S.D.I. programs. In an effort to see how we could satisfy their concern while protecting our principles

**WELCOME BACK:** President and Nancy Reagan being greeted by their daughter Maureen on White House South Lawn Sunday night after the President's return from Iceland.

and security, we proposed a 10-year period in which we began with arms, bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and the weapons they carry.

## Where Debate Began

They would be reduced 50 percent in the first five years. During the next five years, we would continue by eliminating all remaining offensive ballistic missiles, of all ranges. During that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of S.D.I. All done in conformity with ABM provisions. At the 10-year point, with all ballistic missiles eliminated, we could proceed to deploy advanced defenses, at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

Here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted wording that in effect would have kept us from developing the S.D.I. for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing S.D.I. and unless I agreed, all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons would go down the drain — canceled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away S.D.I. — there was no way I could tell our people their Government would protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things, our freedom and our future.

I am still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

So you see, we made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. From the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We declared the principal objective of American foreign policy to be not just the prevention of war, but the extension of freedom. And we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world. That is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously — rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our

strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning to work on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

## Ways to Ease Tensions

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, and ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends — one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental. As I mentioned, one such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy said, "And, is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?"

I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous ones; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past five and a half years.

## Regional Conflicts

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the difference between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. Summit meetings cannot make the American people forget that Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and South America. The Soviet invasion and change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas — those who fight for freedom and independence — will have the support they need. Finally, there was a fourth item. This area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our four-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed against some old areas of disagreement.

And let me return again to the S.D.I. issue. I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up S.D.I. for this agreement?

The answer, my friends, is simple. S.D.I. is America's insurance policy guarantee — if the Soviets should — as they have done too often in the past — fail to comply with their solemn commitment. S.D.I. is what brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table at Geneva and Iceland. S.D.I. is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.

## Forever Vulnerable?

The Soviets understand this. They have devoted far more resources, for a longer time than we, to their own S.D.I. The world's only operational missile defense today surrounds Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. What Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of a 14-year-old ABM treaty that the Soviet Union for already violated. I told him we would not make these kinds of deals in the United States.

And the American people should realize that this is a critical question. How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so



The new York Times photo shows President and Nancy Reagan being greeted by their daughter Maureen on White House South Lawn Sunday night after the President's return from Iceland.

adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles — fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so — forever?

So, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or any future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

## Another Summit Date

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we want to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous ones; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past five and a half years.

Your energy has restored and expanded the strength of our nation; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western Hemisphere and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are beginning to democratize ideas and the principles of the free market. Because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

So, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have the support they need to move steadily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

Our ideas are out there on the table. They won't go away. We are ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators are heading back to Geneva, and we are prepared to go forward whenever and wherever the Soviets are ready. So, there is reason — good reason — for hope.

## Dream and Destiny

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when I left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik — a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at its best: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would have us in a far more frightening world — were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benediction, and her prayers," John Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity — the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our country had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. And that "the supreme need for our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony." It is in pursuit of that ideal I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week. And it is in pursuit of that ideal that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

**RETURNING STAFF:** Donald T. Regan, center rear, White House chief of staff, walking from helicopter to the White House. In foreground, Adm. John M. Poindexter, right, national security adviser, and Vice President Bush.

The New York Times photo shows

## Reagan Blames Gorbachev for Impasse, but Says Accord Is Possible

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bachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we want to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

Mr. Regan made it clear that the key obstacle to Iceland has been the refusal to accept Soviet constraints on the "Star Wars" development.

Mr. Gorbachev had offered to make reductions in long and medium range offensive nuclear missiles in return for an agreement that Mr. Regan said would restrict the development of the missile-defense system.

Once the Soviet leader focused on the missile defense, Mr. Regan said, it became a case of the "zero-sum" agreement to a "bad agreement."

If the Soviets should — as they have done too often in the past — fail to comply with their solemn commitments. S.D.I. is what brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table at Geneva and Iceland. S.D.I. is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.

In a statement after briefing European allies in Brussels today, Secretary of State George P. Shultz said that the progress had emerged in several areas and that it was important that they be pursued "energetically" in future negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Similarly, in a rare on-the-record briefing at the White House, Vice President Bush said that the progress had emerged in several areas and that it was important that they be pursued "energetically" in future negotiations with the Soviet Union.

"We are going to, as they say in the negotiating business, pocket these various pieces that they said they would agree to," Admiral Poindexter said.

"Whether they will admit now that they have agreed to these things or not, they did agree to them and we will try to hold them to that agreement at some point in the future."

Congressional reaction generally was mixed and along partisan lines, with Republicans supporting Mr. Regan's refusal to accept "Star Wars" development and Democrats criticizing the President for missing what they said was a historic opportunity to eliminate offensive nuclear weapons.

At the end of the 10-year period, all ballistic missiles would be eliminated and either country could then deploy the defense shield.

"He was killing S.D.I.," Mr. Regan said. "The General Secretary wanted wording that in effect would have kept us from developing S.D.I. for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing S.D.I. and unless I agreed, all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons would go down the drain — canceled."

"I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away S.D.I. — there was no way I could tell our people their Government would protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things, our freedom and our future."

Administration officials said Mr. Regan had balked at Mr. Gorbachev's insistence on changes in the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty to restrict research, testing and development of missile-defense systems beyond the ABM treaty.

Mr. Regan, who appeared grim, repeated his argument that the Soviet Union was already seeking to develop its own system to defend against nuclear missiles and was doing so in a manner that violated the 1972 treaty. He accused Mr. Gorbachev of seeking to change the agreement through his offer limiting testing to the laboratory.

"I told him that we don't make these kinds of deals in the United States," Mr. Regan said.

"Why Are Soviets So Adamant?" As he sought public understanding of his position, Mr. Regan appeared to be nearly pleading with the Soviet leader, his opposition to the "Star Wars" system and to accept an agreement reducing offensive nuclear weapons.

"How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else?" Mr. Regan said. "Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack?"

"As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles — fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so — forever?"

Mr. Regan's speech was more upbeat in tone than the gloomy and even angry assessment that Administration officials delivered on Sunday after the talks ended. Admiral Poindexter, who agreed today that such an impression had been given, said it was because the talks had been tired.

Mr. Regan said that although the Iceland talks or future discussions would lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings, it was optimistic.

"Our ideas are out there on the table," he said. "They won't go away."